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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
'VESTERN STATES THRIFT &
LOAN COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
12872

WAYNE T. BLOMQUIST,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEl\1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action on a promissory note, which note
was admitted to have been executed and delivered by
defendant to plaintiff.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, Stewart M. Hanson,
Judge, granted plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
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ment. Subsequent to the granting of such summary
judgment, defendant filed a motion for new trial, which
motion was denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent takes exception to the facts set forth
by the appellant and therefore restates the facts of the
case.
Plaintiff commenced suit against defendant on a
promissory note on August 19, 1970, (R.l) to which
an answer was filed by defendant admitting the execution and c;lelivery of said promissory note for value
received and the amount thereof. (R.6) Defendant in
his answer to plaintiff's complaint alleged that the
promissory note sued upon was compromised and
settled by a third party conveying corporate stock to
plaintiff for the benefit of defendant. (R.6) Plaintiff
then served interrogatories upon the defendant inquiring into the basis of the defense of the defendant.
Defendant answered the interrogatorieS of
plaintiff, which answers clearly indicated that defendant
had no actual knowledge of the alleged compromise and
settlement, and further, that all payments alleged to
have been made by defendant were made prior to the
admitted execution and delivery of the promissory note
sued upon. (R.9) Plaintiff then filed a motion for the
production of documents, which motion was granted,
and an order entered (R.13), to which defendant responded that he had been unable to locate any docu·
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ments that he was ordered to produce and thus was
unable to produce same. (R.14) Plaintiff then filed a
motion for summary judgment and notice of hearing
with the lower court, (R.20-23) which motion was
granted. ( R.33-34) Subsequent to the filing of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, defendant filed
and served upon plaintiff interrogatories (R.15-19),
the answering of which interrogatories was rendered
moot by the Court's granting of plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment. Thereafter, defendant filed a
motion for new trial ( R. 28-29) with an affidavit of
defendant, (R.26-27) which motion was denied on
hearing by the lower court. (R.49-50) That at the time
of hearing of both plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and defendant's motion for new trial, the lower
court was made aware of the fact that the third party
alleged by defendant to have compromised and settled
the account, to-wit: Norman Hayes (R.9), was deceased, and had been for sometime prior to the commencement of the action, which fact was known to the
defendant.
POINT I
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BY THE LOWER COURT WAS PROPER IN
THAT THERE WERE NO DISPUTED
ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The execution and delivery of the promissory note
sued upon by plaintiff was admitted by defendant and
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defendant sought to avoid liability for said promissory '
note by asserting a defense of compromise and settlement of the subject obligation by a third party.
(R.6) The discovery of plaintiff in the form of interrogatories failed to show any admissable evidence
which would establish the defense of defendant to
the action of plaintiff, save the name of the third
party, who was, at the time of this action, deceased.
(R.9-10) Further, the affidavit of defendant in opposition to the motion for summary judgment of plaintiff,
failed to set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence and were not made on personal knowledge
of the defendant as required by the provisions of Rule
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R.24-25)
A comparison of defendant's affidavit in opposition
to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with the
affidavit of plaintiff of its motion for summary judgment indicates clearly that defendant's affidavit together with his admission of the execution and delivery
of the promissory note sued upon, was corrobative of
plaintiff's affidavit, rather than in opposition thereto.
The statute of frauds, Title 25-5-4 ( 2) of the Utah
Code Annotated, requires that every promise to answer
for a debt, default or miscarriage of another must be
in writing, or the same is void. The defense of def endant to the action of plaintiff on the promissory note was
based upon an alleged compromise and settlement of
defendant's claim by a third party on behalf of defendant. However, defendant, at the time of hearing
of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, failed to
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show any evidence of an existence of an agreement in
writing, by note or memorandum, which would take
the defense of the defendant outside the statute of
frauds.
Defendant, in his brief on appeal, (Point I, Page
3) asserts the existence of certain disputed facts which
would have precluded the lower court from granting
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The first of
these is wholly without merit when reviewed in connection with the Answer of defendant and defendant's
affidavit in opposition to plaintiff's motion for swnmary
judgment. (R.6-24-27) The second of these is without merit when reviewed in connection with defendant's
answers to plaintiff's interrogatories R.9-10), defendant's affidavit in opposition to plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, (R.24-25) and the provisions of
Rule 56 ( e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
third alleged and asserted disputed fact had not in fact
been raised by the defendant at the time of hearing of
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, in that the
same was asserted in connection with defendant's motion for new trial in his affidavit in support thereof, and
was not before the Court. (R.26-27) Thus, where
disputed facts, as asserted by defendant, would not
establish a basis upon which defendant could avoid his
responsibilities and liability for the note sued upon, no
matter how resolved, it would have been useless to
try the matter, and summary judgment was proper.
Abduekadir vs Western Pacific Railroad, 7 U.2d 53,
318 P.2d 299. Summary judgment also may be based
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upon an affirmative defense, such as the statute of
frauds, where the same would defeat the alleged defense of defendant to the action of plaintiff of compromise and settlement, as is the situation here. Ulibarri
vs Christensen, 2 U.2d 367, 275 P.2d 170.
In applying the rule laid down in the case of
Auto Lease Company vs Central Mutual Insurance
Company, 7 U.2d 366, 325 P.2d 264, and Samms vs.
Ecdes, II U.2d 289, 358 P.2d 334, that a motion for
summary judgment is to be treated as demur and for
purposes of that motion, the facts alleged by defendant
in his affidavit are to be considered true, the Court
cannot be blind to the facts and the law. Defendant's
affidavit in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, to be effective, must set forth such facts as
are admissible in evidence. An affidavit consisting of
inadmissible hearsay evidence would be ineffective and
would not be in compliance with the provisions of Rule
56 ( e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See
Rainford vs Rytting, U.2d 252, 451 P.2d 759) The
Court, at the time of hearing of plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, having before it no other evidence
than that which was contained in the pleadings then
on file, defendant's admission of the note, (R.6) his
answers to plaintiff's interrogatories (R.9-10), plaintiff's affidavit (R.22-23), and defendant's affidavit
(R.24-25), correctly concluded that there were no disputed issues of fact which would have precluded the
granting of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
and granted summary judgment accordingly.
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POINT II
THE GRANTING OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RENDERED
MOOT THE ANSWERING OF INTERROGATORIES OF DEFENDANT BY PLAINTIFF.

i

i

Respondent does not dispute the provisions of
Rule 56 ( c) as set out by defendant in Point II of
his brief. However, defendant overlooks the fact that
plaintiff was not required to answer the interrogatories
of defendant on file at the time of the hearing of plain·
tiff's motion for summary judgment. (Rule 33 URCP)
Where defendant's answer to plaintiff's complaint,
his answers to plaintiff's interogatories, and his affidavit on file merely made a general allegation of compromise and settlement of the complaint of plaintiff
and stated nothing concerning any fact as a basis for
his conclusion in spite of specific interrogatories asking
for such information, the Court was justified in ruling
that the pleadings of defendant did not raise a question
as to a material fact at the time of hearing and the
granting of plaintiff's motion was proper. (Transamerica Title Inc., Co. vs United Resources, Inc., 24
U.2d 346, 471 P.2d 165) Appellant cites no statutory
authority to support his position that unanswered interrogatories precluded the court from granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment under the circumstances
then existing upon the basis of the pleadings then on
file in accordance with Rule 56 ( c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, this Court in the case of
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Transamerica Inc. vs. United Resources, supra, ap-

proved such action by a lower court whereas here, there
existed no disputed issues of fact and granted plaintiff's
motion, though interrogatories of defendant were then
pending.

POINT III
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROCEDURAL AND NOT JURISDICTIONAL.
Respondent does not dispute the provisions of Rules
56 ( c) and 56 ( e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedme
as set forth by appellants in Point III of his brief.
It is also admitted by respondents that plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment and notice thereof (R.20-21)
was heard approximately seven ( 7) days after the date
of mailing of the motion and notice of hearing. ( R.33)
It is important to note that defendant does not claim
that he was prejudiced by reason of the shortened time
for hearing or claim that he has not been given ample
opportunity to be heard. Further, the requirement for
giving of ten ( 10) days notice under Rule 56 ( c) is
for the purpose of giving the opposing party opportunity to prepare opposing affidavits and to be heard.
Appellant cites no authority for his proposition that the
requirement of giving ten ( 10) days notice and the
additional requirement of three (3) days for mailing,
is jurisdictional rather than procedural. Jurisdiction
of this case was established at the time the summons

8

1

!

with complaint were served upon defendant and he
filed his answer to the complaint. The same was not in
question at the time that the motion for summary judgment was filed and served upon defendant.
Rule 56 ( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
is similar to the Federal Rule. A review of cases concerning the requirement of giving at least ten ( 10)
Jays notice reveals that it is discretionary with the Court
to ref use to pass on a motion for summary judgment
when the moving party fails to give proper notice.

(Williams vs Howard Johnson's, Inc. of Washington,

CA Vir. 1963, 323 F.2d 102)

In the case of Ikerd vs Lapworth, CA Ind. 1970,
435 F.2d 197, the Court stated, "The Court's oversight
in disposing of summary judgment motion one day
earlier than provided by this rule, is not ground for
reversal in the absence of any indication of prejudice."
The spirit of subsection ( c) of Rule 56 requiring
service at least ten ( 10) days before the time fixed for
hearing is for the purpose of giving the opposing
party upon which the motion is served ample notice and
opportunity to be heard on the question of summary
dismissal. At no time did defendant, at hearing on the
motions for summary judgment or new trial, raise the
question of lack of ample notice. This question has
been raised here on appeal for the first time. Thus, it
would appear that the defendant-appellant has waived
this particular issue and under familiar principles of
appellant view, a point or issue may not be raised for
9

the first time on appeal. ( Tigeson vs Magna Water
Company, 13 U.2d 397, 975 P.2d 456) Without a ,
showing on the part of defendant that he was prejudiced
and was not given ample opportunity to be heard at i
the time of hearing of plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, the granting of the motion was proper under
such circumstances. (Ikred vs Lampworth, supra., and
Bowridge vs Lehman, CA Ohio, 1958, 252 F.2d 366.
1

CONCLUSION
The only defense raised to the action of plaintiff
by defendant was to the effect that the obligation sued
upon was allegedly compromised and settled by a third i
party for the benefit of defendant. The only evidence
presented by defendant in support of such contention
was to the effect of hearsay statements as contained
in his affidavit in opposition to plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, which failed to be effective in that
it did not set forth such facts as were admissible in
evidence.

Further, the statute of frauds would have pre·
eluded defendant from asserting or proving such defense without some memorandum or note or other agree·
ment in writing. These facts coupled with the fact
that the alleged third party had predeceased the action
of plaintiff against defendant by several months, clearly
showed that the disputed facts would not establish a ,
basis upon which defendant could avoid his responsi·
1
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i

bilities for the obligation sued upon and summary judgment was proper. The fact that the defendant or his
counsel did not object to the hearing on the motion
of summary judgment as being only seven ( 7) days
after the date of mailing of the motion and notice of
hearing of the motion as opposed to the ten (IO) days
as required by Rule 56 ( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; and have failed to allege and make a showing that any prejudice resulted by reason thereof; or
that they were not given ample opportunity to be heard
in this matter; defendant has waived any rights he
may have had concerning the assertion of the failure
to comply with the requirement of notice. The Court
procedeed properly in all respects in granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and its action should
be sustained on appeal.
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court
proceeded properly in granting plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment and that judgment should be
affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
E. H. Fankhauser
COTRO-MANES, WARR,
FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff -Respondent
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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